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Abstract In this paper, we explore the connection between optimal monetary policy and het-
erogeneity among agents. We study a standard monetary economy with two types of agents in
which the stationary distribution of money holdings is non-degenerate. Sans type-specific fiscal
policy, we show that the zero-nominal-interest rate policy (the Friedman rule) does not maximize
type-specific welfare; it may not maximize aggregate social welfare either. Indeed, one or, more
surprisingly, both types may benefit if the central bank deviates from the Friedman rule. Our
results suggest a positive explanation for why central banks around the world do not implement
the Friedman rule.
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1 Introduction
In almost every standard monetary economy populated by representative infinitely-lived agents,
the optimal long run monetary policy is one in which nominal interest rates are zero, also known
as the Friedman rule (Friedman, 1969). Researchers have demonstrated that this result is robust
to a wide variety of modifications.1 Yet, casual empiricism suggests that central banks do not
implement the zero-nominal-interest-rate policy. In this paper, we oﬀer a positive explanation
for why a benevolent central bank may not implement the Friedman rule.
A major part of our analysis is conducted in a fairly standard money-in-the-utility function
(MIUF) economy modified to include the presence of two types of agents, distinguished by their
diﬀerent marginal utilities from real money balances.2 The introduction of this heterogeneity
produces a nondegenerate stationary distribution of money holdings. Put simply, in a steady
state equilibrium, one type holds more money balances than the other. In this setting, faster
money growth aﬀects the welfare of each type through two channels. First, there is the (first
order) rate-of-return eﬀect: both types reduce their money holdings in the face of a higher
opportunity cost. Second, if the central bank is restricted to making (imposing) the same lump-
sum transfer(tax) on both types, a (second order) transfer eﬀect emerges.3 Indeed, for positive
money growth rates, the type that holds more money contributes more to seigniorage than the
other type but receives the same transfer, in eﬀect causing a redistribution of income from the
former to the latter.4 For negative money growth rates, the direction of the redistribution is
reversed: now, the type that holds more money pays a smaller tax, in eﬀect engineering a income
transfer from the type that holds less money to the type that holds more money.
It is possible for the redistributive eﬀect of an increase in the money growth rate to dominate
the rate-of-return eﬀect for some types of agents. In that case, an increase in the money growth
rate may even be welfare enhancing. We are able to show that at least one of the types always
dislikes the Friedman rule (locally), i.e., they are better oﬀ in a lifetime welfare sense if the money
growth rate increases locally around the Friedman rule money growth rate. In most settings, the
type that holds less money dislikes the Friedman rule (locally) but in special circumstances which
we discuss below, even the type that holds more money balances may join the other type in their
1 See, for instance, Woodford (1990) and Ljunqvist and Sargent (2000).
2 An advantage of using the MIUF setup is that it encompasses a wide array of diﬀerent rationales
for valuing money (Feenstra,1986). Many of our assertions carry over into other monetary models with
infinitely-lived agents (for example a cash-in-advance or a shopping time model).
3 Following Pigou and Patinkin, Ireland (2004) calls it the “real balance eﬀect”.
4 A version of this result appears in Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Martin (2005). Our work is part of
a burgeoning literature studying environments with heterogeneity in which the Friedman rule is not
optimal (see, for example, Levine (1991), Edmonds (2002), Green and Zhou (2002), Albanesi (2003), and
Da Costa and Werning (2003).
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shared distaste of the Friedman rule. We go on to show that if the type that holds more money
dislikes the Friedman rule locally, their welfare is never maximized globally at a non-negative
money growth rate. Interestingly, a parallel result for the type that holds less money is that even
if they like the Friedman rule locally, they may be globally better oﬀ at (possibly) a positive
money growth rate. Perhaps most surprisingly, welfare of each type may be maximized away
from the Friedman rule. In other words, it is possible for everyone to prefer positive nominal
interest rates over Friedman’s zero-nominal-interest-rate prescription.5
An intuitive explanation for these results is in order. Recall that the type that holds more
money contributes more to seigniorage than the other type but receives the same transfer. As a
result, she receives net transfers when the money growth rate (i.e., inflation tax rate) is negative.
The net transfer is simply the product of the inflation tax rate and the diﬀerence in money
holdings of the two types. As the money growth increases starting from the Friedman rule money
growth rate, the inflation tax rate rises; this first order eﬀect lowers the net transfer and thus
always hurts the type that holds more money. The eﬀect coming from the changes in agents’
money holdings is more complicated. Much depends on the rate at which each type adjusts their
money balances in response to an increase in the money growth rate. If both types reduce their
money balances at similar rates in response to an increase in the inflation tax rate, then the
aforementioned first order eﬀect dominates; in this case the type that holds more money likes
the Friedman rule. Precisely for the same reason, the type that holds less money will not like the
Friedman rule.
On the other hand, if the type that holds less money changes her money holdings at a faster
rate than the other type, then the diﬀerence in money holdings grows as the money growth rate
is raised. In such a setting, the type that holds more money would increase its net transfers and
therefore dislike the Friedman rule; indeed their welfare may be maximized at a much higher
money growth rate. Under certain parameter sets, we find that the diﬀerence in money holdings
responds non-monotonically to the money growth rate; near the Friedman rule it rises for a while
and then starts to fall again. This makes the size of the redistribution respond non-monotonically
to the money growth rate. This explains why money growth rates higher than that implied by
the Friedman rule, including positive money growth rates, may be welfare maximizing for one
or both types. What is novel here is that while all agents may prefer some deviation from the
Friedman rule, diﬀerent types may want deviations of diﬀerent sizes.
Thus far we have deliberated on the eﬀects of an increase in the money growth rate on type-
specific welfare. What about societal welfare, a population-weighted aggregate welfare of both
5 In a political economy context, it follows that if the central bank is not in any position to (in the
words of current Fed chairman, Alan Greenspan) “shut oﬀ the political pressure valve”, and if the median
voter is the type that likes inflation, the central bank may pursue a positive nominal interest rate policy.
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types? We are able to show that a suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for societal welfare
to not be maximized at the Friedman rule is that the type-specific welfare of the type that
holds less money is not maximized locally there. More generally, we can prove that the societal-
welfare-maximizing money growth rate is non-positive. The upshot is that unlike in models with
homogenous agents, here the prescription for “optimal” monetary policy depends on whether
welfare of the individual or that of society is being maximized.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model economy while Section
3 studies whether the Friedman rule is optimal for both types of agents. In Section 4 we study
the optimal money growth rule that would be chosen by a social planner, while Section 5 studies
the money growth rates that maximize type-specific welfare. Section 6 concludes. Proofs of many
of the results are relegated to the appendices.
2 The model
In this section, we modify the standard representative-agent money-in-the-utility function econ-
omy to include two types of agents distinguished by their preference for real money balances.
The economy is populated by a continuum of unit mass of infinitely-lived agents. Time is discrete
and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, ..,∞. Let µ be the fraction of agents that place a relatively high value
on the services from real money holdings, a notion that will be made precise below.
2.1 The environment
There is a single consumption good which is perishable. Every period both types of households
are endowed with constant y¯ > 0 units of this good.6 Money is the only asset in the economy.
All agents maximize the discounted sum of momentary utilities over an infinite horizon. Agents
who place a relatively high (low) value on the services of real money balances are referred to as
type H (L). The preferences of the type-i where i = H,L agents are represented by
W i ≡
∞X
t=0
βtU i
¡
cit,m
i
t
¢
i = H,L, (1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the agent’s subjective rate of time preference; for a type-i agent, ci is the
quantity of the consumption good, and mit ≡
Mit
pt
denotes the quantity of real money balances
carried over from period t to t + 1. We assume that U ij > 0 and U
i
jj < 0, i = L,H, j = m, c,
where U ij ≡ ∂U
i
∂j and U
i
jj ≡ ∂
2Ui
∂j2 . Also, as is standard, we posit there exists a satiation level of
6 The assumption of an endowment economy is harmless. It will be easy to see, in what follows, that
introducing capital and endowing households with a production technology will yield a steady state
capital stock that is independent of monetary policy.
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real money balances such that ULm
¡
cL,m∗L
¢
= UHm
¡
cH ,m∗H
¢
= 0 with m∗H not less than m∗L.
Finally, we assume UHm (cˆ, mˆ) > U
L
m (cˆ, mˆ), ∀mˆ ≤ m∗H , for i = L,H. In words, for the same
values of consumption and real balances, the type-H derives greater marginal utility from the
services associated with money than does a type-L agent.
Every period, an agent allocates its real balances from last period, current endowment, and
transfers received from the government between current consumption and money balances to be
carried over to the next period. Formally, the budget set of an agent i is defined by
y¯ +
mit−1
(1 + zt)
+ τ t ≥ cit +mit. (2)
where 1+zt =
pt−1
pt
, pt is the price level in period t, and τ denotes transfers from the government.
There are two maximization problems, one for each type of agent. The optimal choice for the
type-i agents, i = L,H is characterized by a sequence
©
cit,m
i
t
ª∞
0
that maximizes W i as given by
(1) subject to its sequence of budget constraints, (2). It is easy to check that the relevant first
order condition is given by
U ic
¡
cit,m
i
t
¢
= U im
¡
cit,m
i
t
¢
+
βU ic
¡
cit+1,m
i
t+1
¢
(1 + zt)
. (3)
Equation (3) has a standard interpretation. At the margin, an agent is indiﬀerent between
consuming a unit this period versus carrying it over and consuming next period. The factor 1+zt
in the denominator of the second term captures the notion that carrying over a unit of nominal
balance this period is worth 11+zt in the next.
The government runs a balanced budget period by period. At each date t ≥ 0, the government
finances a lump-sum tax or transfer, denoted τ , by altering the money supply. Formally, the date-
t government budget constraint is: τ t =
Mt−Mt−1
pt
, where Mt denotes the per-capita quantity of
nominal money at date t. We assume the government follows a constant money growth rule given
by Mt = (1 + z)Mt−1, where z > −1. The money supply expands if z > 0, so that τ t > 0 is a
transfer. Conversely, the money supply contracts if −1 < z < 0, so that τ t < 0 is a tax.
2.2 Stationary equilibrium
In a stationary environment, the price level increases at the same rate as the money supply.
Hence pt = (1 + z) pt−1 obtains. Thus, the money market clearing condition can be represented
as follows:
mt = µm
H
t + (1− µ)mLt (4)
where mt ≡ Mtpt is the economywide stock of real balances. Further, in steady state, consumption
and real money balances are constant over time so that cit = c¯
i, mit = m¯
i, and mt = m¯ for all t.
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Notice that τ t =
zMt−1
pt
= z(1+z)
Mt
pt
which in steady states reduces to τ = z1+z m¯. We assume that
the amount of tax or transfer τ must be the same for both types of agents. This is the precise
sense in which type-specific tax/transfer schemes are disallowed in our model. We justify this
assumption by appealing to the implausibility of a tax/transfer scheme that attempts to identify
people on the basis of their marginal preference for money, an object that is almost impossible
for the government to observe.
Imposing steady state on (3) yields
U im
¡
c¯i, m¯i
¢
U ic (c¯i, m¯i)
= 1− β
1 + z
≡ π (z) . (5)
where π (z), by definition, is the opportunity cost of holding real balances.7 For future reference,
note that as 1+ z → β, or π (z)→ 0, i.e., when the money growth rate approaches the Friedman
rule, the money holdings of each type reach their satiation levels. Finally, note that (5) implies
that, given z, a higher level of consumption is associated with a higher level of real money
balances.
Using the agents’ budget constraints (2), the government’s budget constraint τ = z1+z m¯,
and noting that (4) in steady state implies m¯ = µ m¯H + (1− µ) m¯L, the agents’ steady-state
consumption is given by
c¯L = y¯ + µ
z
1 + z
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
, (6a)
c¯H = y¯ − (1− µ) z
1 + z
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
. (6b)
Thus, m¯L, m¯H , c¯L, and c¯H solve (5) - (6b) simultaneously. Furthermore, it is easy to see that all
the allocations can be implicitly represented as functions of z.
Notice from equations (6a) and (6b) that heterogeneity in money balances aﬀects consumption
of each type. This is because an agent pays a type-specific seigniorage, z1+z m¯
i, whereas the
transfer rebated by the government, z1+z m¯, is type-independent. Thus
z
1+z
¡
m¯− m¯i
¢
, which is
the second term in both equations, is the net transfer to an agent i. In the absence of any
heterogeneity, this net transfer would be zero. Henceforth, we identify the second terms in (6a)
7 Note that the gross nominal interest rate 1 + i = β−1 (1 + z). Thus π = i
1+i .
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and (6b) as capturing the transfer eﬀect.8 Evidently, the transfer eﬀect depends on the money
growth rate and the diﬀerence between the real balances held by the two types.
Below we will establish suﬃcient conditions under which the H types hold more money than
the L types, i.e., m¯H ≥ m¯L will obtain. We will further specify conditions under which both m¯H
and m¯L monotonically decrease with z. The reason why we are unable to obtain condition-free
results is the following. On the one hand, depending on whether the inflation tax rate is positive
or negative, one or the other type is getting a net income transfer; the type that gets the transfer
can aﬀord to hold more money. However, the diﬀerent marginal utilities from holding money also
dictates whether they actually hold more money or not.
2.3 Money growth rate and allocations
For analytical convenience, we assume a separable utility form given by
U i (c,m) = u (c) + vi (m) ; i ≡ L,H,
where vi (m) ≡ λi
£
w (m)−mw0
¡
m∗i
¢¤
, and both u and w have CES forms, c1−σ/1 − σ. To
conform to our assumptions made in Section 2.1, we assume λH > λL and m∗H ≥ m∗L hold.
Then, for any mˆ,
UHm (cˆ, mˆ)
ULm (cˆ, mˆ)
=
λH
£
w0 (mˆ)− w0
¡
m∗H
¢¤
λL [w0 (mˆ)− w0 (m∗L)]
> 1. (7)
We are then able to show the following.
Lemma 1 Suppose
y¯ > y¯∗, (A.1)
where y¯∗ is implicitly determined by
uc(y¯∗+µ(1−β)m∗L)
uc(y¯∗−(1−µ)(1−β)m∗L) =
λL
λH . Then given the assumptions on
preferences and endowments, m¯H > m¯L for all m∗H > m∗L, i.e., the H types hold more money
than the L types. If m∗H = m∗L, m¯H > m¯L ∀ z > β − 1 and m¯H = m¯L at z = β − 1.
8 An alternative explanation of the transfer eﬀect is the following. Suppose there is no heterogeneity,
and all agents were identically L types. As all seigniorage is rebated back to the agents, the net transfer
will trivially be zero. Suppose instead that a fraction µ of agents hold “excess real balances”, m¯H−m¯L ≥
0. As the excess seigniorage z
1+z

m¯H − m¯L

raised from them is equally redistributed to all, it transpires
that each agents (of both types) receive µ z
1+z

m¯H − m¯L

as ‘excess rebate’, which equals the net transfer
to an L type as in equation (6a). On the other hand, each H type pays z
1+z

m¯H − m¯L

but receives only
µ z
1+z

m¯H − m¯L

. As a result, each H type’s loss of income equals (1− µ) z
1+z

m¯H − m¯L

. The above
interpretation assumed z > 0. It is easy to argue that z < 0 simply reverses the direction of income
redistribution.
8 Joydeep Bhattacharya et al.
When z ≥ 0, the intuition behind why the H types hold more money than the L types is
straightforward. If it were otherwise, there would be a net income transfer away from the L
types. A lower income in addition to a lower marginal utility from money would imply that they
are holding lower real balances than the H types, thus contradicting our initial supposition. For
z < 0, suppose contrary to Lemma 1 that L types hold more money and thus receive net income
transfers. Now the income eﬀect and the relatively lower preference for real balances work in
opposite directions. If (A.1) is satisfied, the income eﬀect from transfers is dominated and L
types always hold relatively smaller real balances.
An immediate implication of Lemma 1 is that
Corollary 1
c¯H R c¯L ⇐⇒ z Q 0. (8)
The type that holds more money gets the higher consumption if and only if there is deflation.
Further, diﬀerentiating (6a) and (6b) yields
1
µ
dcL
dz
= − 1
1− µ
dcH
dz
(9)
=
z
1 + z
µ
dmH
dz
− dm
L
dz
¶
+
1
(1 + z)2
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢| {z }
≥0
, (10)
Notice first that a change in z aﬀects income transfers between the two types, and thus, changes
in consumption have opposite signs (see eq. (9)). Lemma 1 ensures that the second term in (10) is
positive. Thus, a higher z brings more (less) income transfers for the L (H) types. The first term,
on the other hand, depends on the diﬀerential rate of change of real balances of the two types.
In general, away from the Friedman rule, it turns out that the second term in (10) dominates
the first, and thus consumption of L (H) types increases (decreases) with z. However, near the
Friedman rule, as both types adjust their real balances relatively sharply towards satiation, the
direction of consumption changes may depend on their rates of real balance adjustment relative
to each other. If these adjustment rates are similar, the second term in (10) still dominates
and consumption of L (H) types increases (decreases) with z. However, with a specific set of
parameters, we find that the diﬀerence in money holdings responds non-monotonically with the
money growth rate; near the Friedman rule it rises for a while and then starts to fall again. Then
the direction of the changes in consumption is reversed.
Thus, in order to further study changes in allocations with respect to z, we need to first
understand how real balances of both types change with z.
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Lemma 2 At the Friedman rule, real money balances of both types are decreasing in the money
growth rate. Furthermore, suppose
y¯ > y¯∗∗, (A.2)
where y¯∗∗ ≡
³
ϕ− 1−βλH
´
m∗H , and where ϕ ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
µσ (1− β) if σβ < 1
µ (σ − 1) if σβ > 1
. Then, real money
balances for both types are decreasing in the money growth rate for all z ≥ 0.
From (5), it follows that if consumption remained the same, real balances would simply
decrease with z, a pure price eﬀect. However, as is clear from (6a) and (6b), consumption of both
types changes with z. Moreover, (6a) and (6b) imply a) if the diﬀerence m¯H − m¯L remained
same, a higher z will bring more (less) income for the L (H) types, b) m¯H − m¯L changes with z,
which also impacts their income. The two income eﬀects of z may combine or oppose each other
but, in general, the first component dominates. As a result, as z increases the total income of H
(L) types decreases (increases). Thus, for H types a higher z not only increases the opportunity
cost of money, but also decreases their income. As a result, m¯H is decreasing in z. On the other
hand, the income of L types is increasing in z. Assumption (A.2) ensures that the income eﬀect
is dominated by the price eﬀect of a higher z. Thus, m¯L is also decreasing in z.9
Note in passing that Assumptions (A.1) and (A.2) are suﬃcient but not necessary. Further,
both can be combined as y¯1−β > max {y¯∗, y¯∗∗} .
3 Who does not like the Friedman rule?
In this section, we first show that for a general class of MIUF models it is never the case that the
Friedman rule is optimal for both types of agents. To verify whether this result holds under model
specifications in which monetary policy has an output eﬀect, we then study a cash-in-advance
economy with production.
3.1 One type always dislikes the Friedman rule
We start by proving that for all the utility functions that incorporate satiation the Friedman
rule is disliked by one type. The marginal rate of substitution between consumption and real
9 Lemma 2 asserts that real money balances for both types are decreasing in the money growth rate
both locally near the Friedman rule and globally for all non-negative money growth rates. While it does
not claim a similar behavior for the allowable range of negative money growth rates, such behavior is
infact true. Numerical examples confirm it; additionally a messier analog of a suﬃcient condition like
(A.2) can easily be written.
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balances are given by (5), which is repeated below for convenience:
U im
¡
c¯i, m¯i
¢
Uc (c¯i, m¯i)
= 1− β
1 + z
≡ π (z) . (5)
Note that by assumption ULm
¡
c¯L,m∗L
¢
= UHm
¡
c¯H ,m∗H
¢
= 0. Therefore, at the Friedman rule,
m¯i = m∗i.
The analysis in Section 2 implies that the equilibrium steady state utilities of agents can be
expressed as function of the money growth rate z. Further, using (5), it follows that
(1− β) dW
i
dz
= U ic
dc¯i
dz
+ U im
dm¯i
dz
= U ic
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
dc¯i
dz|{z}
Transfer eﬀect
+ π (z)
dm¯i
dz| {z }
Rate-of-return eﬀect
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ (11)
Notice that the first term within brackets represents the transfer eﬀect of changes in z, while
the second term denotes its rate-of-return eﬀect. Since real balances are decreasing in z, the
rate-of-return eﬀect hurts both types when z is increased. Note from (5) that at the Friedman
rule, the second term in (11) vanishes. Thus, at the Friedman rule, a change in utility takes place
solely through a change in consumption. From (9), we know that the change in consumption for
the two types have opposite signs. Thus, using (9), it follows that
dWL
dz
= −U
L
c
UHc
µ
1− µ
dWH
dz
(12)
Hence, increasing z at the Friedman rule is always a local improvement for one type of agents.
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Given our assumptions, the Friedman rule is always (locally) disliked by one
type.
Notice that at the Friedman rule, both types are optimally satiated with real balances. Hence,
a small change in z (engineered via changes in real balances) has no rate-of-return eﬀect on their
welfare. However, changes in real balances do aﬀect net transfers between agents; indeed equation
(11) makes clear that the direct rate-of-return eﬀect of an increase in z is washed out leaving
only the indirect transfer eﬀect. As eq. (12) highlights, the transfer eﬀect hurts one and benefits
the other; as such, it can never be, that locally near the Friedman rule, both types will want
money growth rates unchanged. Recall from (6a) and (6b) that the transfer eﬀect depends on the
gap between real balances held by the two types. If this gap shrinks as z increases, net transfers
to (from) H (L) types decreases. In that case, L (H) types will be made better (worse) oﬀ by
a local deviation in z. On the other hand, if the aforementioned gap widens, net transfers will
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depend on changes in the product z1+z
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
, which in turn will depend on the preference
specification. Nevertheless, the change will hurt one type at the cost of the other.10
The following Lemma 3 establishes necessary and suﬃcient conditions to identify the agent
type that would benefit from a marginal increase in z at the Friedman Rule.
Lemma 3 Given agents’ preferences, L (H) types will prefer an increase in z at the Friedman
rule, if and only if
uc
¡
c∗H
¢
λHwmm (m∗H)
−
uc
¡
c∗L
¢
λLwmm (m∗L)
< (>)
m∗H −m∗L
1− β , (13)
where c∗L and c∗H denote consumptions of L type and H type respectively, at the Friedman rule.
We can explain the condition (13) as follows. Suppose z is increased infinitesimally at the
Friedman rule. Then there will be a change in the net transfer between the two types attributable
to two eﬀects: a) a change in inflation tax rate z1+z and b) a change in the diﬀerence between the
real balances of the two types m¯H − m¯L. Increasing z reduces z1+z in absolute value and thus
reduces (increases) transfers to the H (L) types. However, if the diﬀerence between real balances
widens, i.e., dm
H
dz −
dmL
dz > 0, then H (L) types are better (worse) oﬀ by a larger transfer. The
right hand side of condition (13) in Lemma 3 represents the tax rate eﬀect, while the left hand
side represents the eﬀect of changes in real balances. If the widening of real balances dominates
the tax rate change, the H (L) types will (will not) prefer a deviation from the Friedman rule.
The situation is reversed if the widening of real balances is smaller, or if it shrinks instead, i.e.,
dmH
dz −
dmL
dz < 0.
It is instructive to work through a special case. To that end, start by assuming that m∗H =
m∗L holds; then it is obvious that c∗L = c∗H holds. In this case, notice that condition (13) in
Lemma 3 reduces to
1
λHwmm (m∗H)
− 1
λLwmm (m∗L)
< (>) 0 (14)
Since λH > λL and wmm < 0 holds, eq. (14) implies that the L types like the Friedman rule, but
the H types would prefer a higher money growth rate.11 Thus, in this case, even the H types
(who always hold higher real balances relative to L types, and with z < 0, are the net receivers of
income) dislike the Friedman rule. This can happen because of the following reason. Notice that
while the Friedman rule obtains the agents a satiation level of real balances, it does not maximize
their income from net transfers. Now as z rises, faced with a positive opportunity cost, both types
reduce their real balances. However, the decrease in L types’ real balances is sharper relative to
10 Notice that the assumption of separability is not required for the result stated in Proposition 1.
11 By continuity, same holds true even for cases where m∗H > m∗L, but λH is suﬃciently larger than
λL.
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that of the H types. Thus with a marginal increase in z, the H types can obtain bigger transfers
(which to them has a positive worth in terms of marginal utility of consumption), whereas losing
real balances at the margin is costless to them since they are already satiated with real balances.
The same logic implies that L types will not prefer a local deviation from the Friedman rule.
Note however, it is not clear from the above condition if the Friedman rule is globally preferred
by L types. Finally, suppose that the condition stated in Lemma 3 holds in a way such that L
types prefer a higher money growth rate than the Friedman rule. Again, even though now the
H types do not prefer a local increase in z, it is not clear if the Friedman rule maximizes their
welfare.
The above discussion raises two key policy questions. First, what are the most-preferred type-
specific money growth rules? And, more importantly, what is the socially optimal money growth
rate? While the answer to the first question is postponed until Section 5, the socially optimal
level of z is studied next in Section 4.
3.2 Models in which superneutrality fails
Is Proposition 1 simply an artifact of the assumptions in the model that yields superneutrality?
If changes in the money growth rate distort output, do our results disappear? Below we first
present a simple extension of our model that adds a labor-leisure choice and which reaﬃrms
the results stated in Proposition 1. Next, we contrast our results with a cash-in-advance set
up where monetary growth additionally creates an intertemporal price distortion that depresses
output. Both extensions prove that the presence of superneutrality is not needed for the flavor
of Proposition 1 to survive.
3.2.1 MIUF with labor-leisure choice Here, each agent has a unit of time that it can divide
between labor and leisure. Let agents’ momentary utility be given by U i (c, l,m) and let each
type have access to an identical production technology described by f (l), where f has the
standard properties of a production function. It is straightforward to show that the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and labor is given by
−U
i
l
U ic
= fl
¡
li
¢
(15)
Now that each agent’s output is given by f
¡
li
¢
, using (6a) and (6b), their consumption is given
by
c¯L = f
¡
l¯L
¢
+
z
1 + z
µ
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
c¯H = f
¡
l¯H
¢
− z
1 + z
(1− µ)
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
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As before, each agent’s allocations and utility can be implicitly expressed as a function of z.
Diﬀerentiating the L types’ utility with respect to z yields
dUL
dz
= ULl
dlL
dz
+ ULc fl
¡
lL
¢ dlL
dz
+ ULc
d
dz
∙
z
1 + z
µ
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢¸
+ ULm
dmL
dz
,
which using (15) reduces to
dUL
dz
= ULc
d
dz
∙
µ
z
1 + z
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢¸
+ ULm
dmL
dz
Again, the second term in the above equation vanishes at the Friedman rule. Combining the
above with a similar equation for the H types replicates (12).
3.2.2 A cash-in-advance economy The agents’ heterogeneity now stems from their diﬀerential
abilities to produce and therefore accumulate unequal real balances from the sale of their produce.
Here, both types of agents have identical preferences in consumption (c) and leisure (1− l),
represented by a standard utility function u (c, 1− l). Agents produce consumption goods by
using the following technology
yi = αif
¡
li
¢
, αH > αL, f 0 > 0.
As is standard in these models, we assume that a household consists of a shopper-seller pair, who
separate at the beginning of each period and then reunite in the end. While the seller works at
the mill and sells the output, the shopper goes to the mills (other than her own) with cash to
purchase goods. Note that the money accumulated through sales can only be used for purchases
during the next period. Thus, once the inflation is taken into account, a unit of labor that earns
αif 0
¡
li
¢
units of goods today is worth only α
i
1+zf
0 ¡li¢ units tomorrow. At the optimum, an agent
is indiﬀerent between enjoying a unit of leisure today, or working in the market and consuming
αi
1+zf
0 ¡li¢ units of goods tomorrow. Thus, a household’s optimal labor leisure choice is given by
−uil =
αif 0
¡
li
¢
(1 + z)
βuic, (17)
where uij ≡ uj
¡
c¯i, l¯i
¢
. Alternatively, (17) equates the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure u
i
l
uic
to its marginal rate of transformation αif 0
¡
li
¢
discounted by the
gross nominal interest rate (1 + z)β−1. Were the labor earnings consumed during the same
period, the relative price of earnings to consumption would identically equal 1. Thus, the cash-
in-advance constraint lowers the price of earnings relative to consumption by 1 − β1+z , which
discourages work relative to the case in which earnings are consumed contemporaneously.
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Further, in the steady state, agents’ consumption is given by [see (42a) and (42b) in Appendix
E]
c¯L = αLf
¡
l¯L
¢
+
z
1 + z
µ
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
(18a)
c¯H = αHf
¡
l¯H
¢
− z
1 + z
(1− µ)
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
(18b)
Observe that the terms in the above expressions are identical to those in (6a) and (6b), except
that agents’ output now depends on their optimal choice of labor which in turn depends on the
money growth rate z.
Once again, agents’ steady state utilities can be expressed as functions of z. Then,
dui
dz
= uic
dc¯i
dz
+ uil
dl¯i
dz
,
which, using (17) - (18b), yields
duL
dz
= uLc α
Lf 0
¡
l¯L
¢µ
1− β
1 + z
¶
dl¯L
dz| {z }
Rate-of-return eﬀect
+ uLc
d
dz
∙
z
1 + z
µ
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢¸
| {z }
Transfer eﬀect
, (19)
duH
dz
= uHc α
Hf 0
¡
l¯H
¢µ
1− β
1 + z
¶
dl¯H
dz
− uHc
d
dz
∙
z
1 + z
(1− µ)
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢¸
.
Notice that the first term on the right hand side of (19) captures the rate-of-return eﬀect, while
the second term represents the transfer eﬀect. As discussed above, the rate-of-return eﬀect now
stems from the intertemporal price wedge introduced by the cash-in-advance constraint. Under
some mild restrictions on preferences, it can be shown that a higher rate of inflation z discourages
work.12 Then, as in our MIUF version, the rate-of-return eﬀect implies that both types are hurt
by an increase in z, while the net transfer eﬀect benefits one type at the cost of the other.
Notice also that the intertemporal price wedge 1 − β1+z , and thus the rate-of-return eﬀect,
vanishes at the Friedman rule. The change in welfare can be attributed solely to the transfers
and, once again, the result is identical to (12) obtained for the MIUF version, i.e.,
dWL
dz
= − u
L
c
uHc
µ
1− µ
dWH
dz
.
Thus, as before, one type dislikes the Friedman rule.
12 For example, preferences of the form
u (c, l) = u

c− l
ν
ν

, ν > 1
will readily generate this result.
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4 Social Welfare
The preceding analysis showed that precisely one type of agents will prefer a local deviation
from the Friedman rule. That is, the type-specific welfare of one of the types is not maximized
at the Friedman rule money growth rate. Is the Friedman rule “socially optimal” in this case?
In order to answer this question, we first define social welfare W as a population-weighted sum
of type-specific utilities.13 Formally:
W ≡ (1− µ)WL + µWH ,
where WH and WL are as given by (1). A benevolent central bank chooses z to maximize W
(where z˜ ≡ argmax
z
W ), i.e., pick the z that solves dWdz ≤ 0. 14
4.1 When is the Friedman rule socially optimal?
Diﬀerentiating W with respect to z and using (12) it can be shown that at the Friedman rule,
i.e., at zFR ≡ β − 1,
dW
dz
¯¯¯¯
zFR
= µ
duH
dz
+ (1− µ) du
L
dz
= (1− µ)
µ
1− u
H
c
uLc
¶
duL
dz
holds. Notice that
dW
dz
¯¯¯¯
zFR
½
= 0 if m∗H = m∗L
R 0 if m∗H > m∗L and iﬀ duLdz R 0.
(20)
If m∗H = m∗L holds, then c¯H = c¯L, and uLc = u
H
c holds; here the Friedman rule is also globally
optimal as it allocates consumption eﬃciently while simultaneously allowing both types to hold
their satiation level of real balances. On the other hand, if m∗H > m∗L, at the Friedman rule
c¯H > c¯L, and thus uLc > u
H
c . The following proposition is then immediate from an examination
of (20).
Proposition 2 If m∗H > m∗L, the Friedman rule is socially optimal only if the L types do not
prefer a higher money growth rate.
Proposition 2 states that for the Friedman rule to be socially optimal it is necessary that
the L types locally like it. Conversely, it is implied that the Friedman rule can not be socially
optimal if increasing z yields a higher utility for the L types. At the Friedman rule, all agents
13 Our notion of social optimality is identical to the parallel concept of ex-ante optimality; in the latter,
agents “pick their preferred monetary policy under a “veil of ignorance”, before knowing their true
identity” [Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000)]; hence they attach a probability µ of being the H type.
14 The inequality accounts for the case in which the Friedman rule money growth rate happens to be
a corner solution.
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are optimally satiated with real balances. Therefore, a marginal increase in z which cause real
balance holdings to decline marginally is costless in terms of lost marginal utility. However, since
m∗H > m∗L, at the Friedman rule c¯H > c¯L (see (8)), and therefore, the L types value a unit of
consumption more than the H types do. So it is eﬃcient to redistribute some income from the
H to the L types in order to allocate consumption more eﬃciently. This would make the L types
better oﬀ and render the Friedman rule socially sub-optimal.
On the other hand, if L types prefer the Friedman rule to any marginal increase, then
dW
dz
¯¯
zFR
< 0. But, it does not ensure that the Friedman rule is also globally optimal. In Section 5
we show that even when the L types prefer the Friedman rule locally, their type-specific optimal
choice may turn out to be z > 0. Arguably, under such a scenario, a social planner may choose
a z˜ > β − 1.
4.2 Can a positive money growth rate ever be socially optimal?
Clearly, if the L types do not like the Friedman rule, the planner’s choice is z˜ > β − 1. Even
otherwise, the planner may choose z˜ > β−1. But can z˜ ever be positive? The following proposition
asserts that z˜ must be negative.
Proposition 3 The socially optimal money growth rate is negative, i.e., β − 1 ≤ z˜ < 0.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is quite straightforward. By choosing z > 0, the planner
imposes a needless opportunity cost on all agents’ stock of real balances; additionally, as argued
above, by making c¯H < c¯L, the planner engineers an ineﬃcient income redistribution. If the
money supply is constant, i.e., z = 0, there is no income redistribution and c¯H = c¯L. The
marginal social cost of reallocating consumption at z = 0 is essentially zero. Thus, both types
can gain by holding marginally higher real balances; this can be achieved by marginally cutting
z from z = 0.
5 Type-specific optimal rules
We go on to study the question: which money growth rate is globally liked by each type? In
particular, is it possible that both types would like money growth rates that are higher than that
implied by the Friedman rule? Can they each prefer positive money growth rates? Our analysis
below shows that the type-specific welfare maximizing values of z for both types, denoted as z˜L
and z˜H , crucially depend on their relative preference for real balances, particularly the money
demand elasticities.
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First, we specialize to a special functional form first popularized by Greenwood, Hercowitz,
and Huﬀman (1988). Let utility be defined as follows:
U i
¡
ci,mi
¢
= u
∙
ci + λi
µ
lnmi − m
i
m∗i
¶¸
; i ≡ H,L, λH > λL (21)
We choose this form for two reasons. First, it enables us to make analytical progress and compute
a closed form solution for the optimal z that is liked by each type. Second, it diﬀerentiates between
the rate-of-return and transfer eﬀects with changes in z more sharply. Note that the basic dispute
between the two types over the choice of z arises from the fact that their unequal real balances
lead to unequal net transfers from the government, which in turn generates income eﬀects for the
both types. With a more general utility form, the income eﬀect will aﬀect agents’ real balances
as well as consumption. With (21), real balances are insulated from the income eﬀect and the
changes in income are completely absorbed by the changes in consumption. As a result, the
choice of real balances solely depend on the rate of money growth z.
Using (5), the optimal demand for real balances is given by
m¯i =
µ
π (z)
λi
+
1
m∗i
¶−1
=
m∗i
1 + m
∗i
λi π (z)
, (22)
where π (z) ≡ 1− β1+z . It is clear from equation (22) that both types are satiated with real balances
at the Friedman rule. Further, real balances of both types decrease as the money growth rate
is raised implying that the flavor of Lemma 1 continues to hold. We maintain our assumptions
from Section 2.3 that m∗H ≥ m∗L and λH > λL hold. In addition, if we further assume that
λH
λL
≥ m
∗H
m∗L
(A.3)
hold, then as evident from (22), a stronger version of the result in Lemma 2 also holds; indeed,
under (A.3), the H type’s preference for real balances are uniformly stronger than the L type at
all z. Both "= ” and ">" in the above assumption are studied below.
5.1 Equal elasticities of money demand
We further assume that the money demand elasticities of the two types with respect to z, denoted
as ζm¯i,z, are equal.
15 First, note that
ζm¯i,z ≡
¯¯¯¯
¯ dm¯
i
m¯i
dz
z
¯¯¯¯
¯ =
¯¯¯¯
¯ κi1 + κiπ (z) βz(1 + z)2
¯¯¯¯
¯ , (23)
15 The optimal value of z for the H type is critically aﬀected by this assumption. In the next subsection,
we allow the types to have diﬀerent elasticities of money demand.
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where κi ≡ m∗iλi . Then for the money demand elasticities of the two types to be equal, it is
required that
m∗i
λi
= κi = κ, ∀ i (24)
hold. Further, notice that since λH > λL holds, it is implied that m∗H > m∗L. It directly follows
from (22) that
m¯H − m¯L = m
∗H −m∗L
1 + κπ (z)
(25)
From equation (25) it is obvious that m¯H − m¯L increases as money growth rate is lowered. In
particular, this diﬀerence peaks at the Friedman rule.
Note from (6b) that the net transfer to H types, which equals − (1− µ) z1+z
m∗H−m∗L
1+κπ(z) , is
positive when z < 0. A simple diﬀerentiation verifies that these transfers decrease as z increases.
Clearly, at the Friedman rule, the H types enjoy the maximum consumption feasible at any
z ≥ β− 1, in addition to satiating themselves with real balances. Thus, the Friedman rule is the
best rule for the H types, i.e., z˜H = β − 1.
The net transfer to the L types, on the other hand, is negative as long as z is negative.
However, they do enjoy the benefits of a lower inflation by holding a higher stock of real balances.
The optimal z for them, thus, depends on the trade-oﬀ between these two eﬀects. At the Friedman
rule, the rate of return eﬀect vanishes as discussed in Section 3. However, both the seigniorage
tax rate z1+z and the diﬀerence between the real balances of the two types m¯
H − m¯L decrease
in absolute value at the Friedman rule, as z is increased. Thus, L types would benefit from an
increase in the money growth rate as the absolute value of net transfers from them decreases .
Then the question is what is the optimal money growth rate for the L types? In particular, is a
positive z ever optimal for them? To compute z˜L, we first obtain the consumption of L types by
substituting (25) in (6a):
c¯L = y¯ + µ
z
1 + z
m∗H −m∗L
1 + κπ (z)
, (26)
Thus z˜L is obtained by maximizing L types’ utility, i.e., as a solution to
duL
dz
=
¡
uL
¢0 d
dz
∙
c¯L + λL
µ
ln m¯L − m¯
L
m∗L
¶¸
= 0.
Substituting (22) and (26) into the above equation implies that z˜L solves
µ
µ
1
1 + z
¶2 m∗H −m∗L
1 + κπ (z)
− µ z
1 + z
m∗H −m∗L
(1 + κπ (z))2
κπ0 (z)| {z }
Transfer eﬀect
=π (z)
m∗L
(1 + κπ (z))2
κπ0 (z)| {z }
Rate-of-return eﬀect
where π0 (z) = β
³
1
1+z
´2
. The above equation simply states that at the optimum, the marginal
cost of raising z in terms of its rate-of-return eﬀect, equals the marginal benefit of a higher z in
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terms of its transfer eﬀect. Some algebra yields
z˜L =
β2m∗L
βm∗L − µ (m∗H −m∗L) ((1− β) + 1/κ) − 1 (27)
The following Lemma establishes the necessary and suﬃcient conditions which determine
when z˜L is positive.
Lemma 4 The L types prefer a positive money growth rate if and only if
m∗H
m∗L
> 1 +
β
µ
µ
1 +
1
(1− β)κ
¶
The higher the ratio m
∗H
m∗L , and higher the fraction of H types in the population, µ, the higher
is the transfer to the L types under a positive money growth rate. Then it may be optimal for the
L types to sacrifice utility from real balances in favor of higher income transfers. As an example,
for β = 0.96, µ = 0.5, λH = 1, λL = 0.1, m∗H = 100, and m∗L = 10 the above condition is
satisfied. Substituting these values in (27) yields an optimal value z˜L = 0.2539.
It is not possible to make any analytical progress toward the issue of globally optimal z,
even using common functional forms like the CRRA or the ln. Below we will present the results
of several numerical exercises using these common functional forms that will shed light on the
questions that motivated this section. For each of these examples below, we set y¯ .= 2.28, β = 0.96
and µ = 0.5.
Example 1 (Logarithmic utility) Suppose ui
¡
c¯i, m¯i
¢
= ln c¯i + λi
³
ln m¯i − m¯im∗i
´
where λH = 1 >
λL = 0.1. Assume m∗H = 100 and m∗L = 10. Then as illustrated below, the L types like a
positive value of z while the H types like the Friedman rule.
Example 2 (CRRA utility) Suppose ui
¡
ci,mi
¢
= ln ci + λi
µ
(mi)
1− 1σ
1− 1σ
− mi
(m∗i)
1
σ
¶
, where λH =
1 > λL = 0.1. Assume m∗H = 100 and m∗L = 10. Then for σ = 2, as illustrated below, the L
types like a positive value of z while the H types like the Friedman rule.
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The exact story as told by these examples is fairly robust to numerous changes in the para-
metric specifications.
5.2 Unequal elasticities
In this section, we show that it is possible that neither type likes the Friedman rule. For this
purpose, we drop the assumption (24) and allow the elasticities of money demand to be unequal
across the two types. In particular, we assume that
m∗H
λH
= κH <
m∗L
λL
= κL. (28)
For simplicity, we assume that the satiation level of real balances is same for the both types, i.e.,
m∗H = m∗L = m∗. However, we maintain our earlier assumption that λH > λL.16 Thus, (22)
can be rewritten as
m¯i =
m∗
(1 + κiπ (z))
(29)
Thus, m¯H > m¯L for all z > β − 1. Assumption (28) implies that close to the Friedman rule the
elasticity of money demand for the L types exceeds that of the H types. Indeed, note that¯¯¯
ζm¯i,z
¯¯
z=β−1
¯¯¯
= κi
1− β
β
Thus, our assumptions on preferences essentially imply that although the H types always hold
a higher stock of real balances relative to the L types, the closer is the z to the Friedman rule,
the faster is the rate of adjustment of real balances (to changes in z) of the L types relative to
the H types.
Next, using (6a) and (6b) with (29), the steady state consumptions can be rewritten as
c¯L = y¯ + µ
z m∗
1 + z
∙
1
(1 + κHπ (z))
− 1
(1 + κLπ (z))
¸
, (30)
c¯H = y¯ − (1− µ) z m
∗
1 + z
∙
1
(1 + κHπ (z))
− 1
(1 + κLπ (z))
¸
. (31)
16 The equality of satiation levels is not necessary and our results hold even if we allow m∗H > m∗L. If
so, a λH suﬃciently larger than λL will generate the results that follow. See the discussion that follows
Lemma 3.
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We know from (12) that one of the types would benefit if the central bank deviates from
the Friedman rule. The following Lemma clarifies that it is now the H types that dislike the
Friedman rule.
Lemma 5 The Friedman rule is disliked by the H types; indeed, they would prefer a positive
nominal interest rate. However, z˜H ∈ (β − 1, 0).
The result that z˜H > β− 1 has the following intuition. Recall from (6b) that the net transfer
to the H types depends on the gap between real balances of the two types. Although this gap
is always positive, it may shrink or widen as z is decreased depending on the relative elasticities
of the two types at any given z. Since the L types have a relatively higher elasticity of money
demand close to the Friedman rule, the gap shrinks as z gets closer to the Friedman rule. Thus,
it turns out that the net transfer to the H types becomes smaller as z gets closer to the Friedman
rule. As the rate-of-return eﬀect vanishes at the Friedman rule, z˜H > β − 1. On the other hand,
it is clear that z˜H < 0. At such a money growth rate, the H types gain on both dimensions: they
receive positive net transfers from the L types, and also benefit from the rate-of-return eﬀect.
Also from (12), it is clear that the L types would dislike a small deviation from the Fried-
man rule; hence the L types like the Friedman rule locally. It remains to be checked whether
the Friedman rule is also their global optimum. Below we show that under certain parameter
restrictions, the L types will be better oﬀ at some z > β − 1. The following Lemma asserts that
z˜L either equals zFR or is positive. In addition, it establishes suﬃcient conditions when z˜L > 0.
Lemma 6 z ∈ (β − 1, 0) can never be optimal for the L types. Furthermore, if λH >> λL, i.e.,
if the preference of H types for real balances is suﬃciently stronger than for the L types, z˜L > 0
holds.
The intuition behind this result is quite obvious. At the Friedman rule, not only the L types
consume their total endowment, but they also satiate themselves with real balances. The only
way they can be induced to like any other z is if there is a net income and consumption gain
that compensates for them for their resultant loss of real balances. When λH is suﬃciently large,
the H type will hold a suﬃciently large amount of money even when z > 0. As a result, at some
z > 0, L types receive a level of net transfers that gives them a higher welfare than that available
at zFR.
Following the derivation in Appendix G, assume m∗ = e, λL = 0.1. Then for any λH > 0.7699
even though the L types dislike a local increase in z at the Friedman rule, their global optimum
now is z˜L = 0.25. We verify the robustness of our result via the following CRRA example.
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Example 3 Suppose U i
¡
ci,mi
¢
= ln ci + λi
Ã
(mi)
1− 1
σi
1− 1
σi
− mi
(m∗i)
1
σi
!
, where λH = 0.7 and λL =
0.1. Assume m∗H = m∗L = 20, and µ = 0.5. Suppose σH = 2 and σL = 0.5. Then as illustrated
below, both the types dislike the Friedman rule.
Thus, for the set of parameter values derived above, the Friedman rule does not maximize
welfare for any of the types. The following set of figures tell the same story as has been laid out
above.
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6 Concluding remarks
By construction, monetary policy cannot have redistributive eﬀects in representative-agent mod-
els. Yet these eﬀects are known to be quantitatively significant and important (see, for example,
Erosa and Ventura, 2002). The purpose of this paper is to examine whether optimal monetary
policy is sensitive to heterogeneity. To that end, we develop a model economy in which the equi-
librium distribution of money holdings is non-degenerate. The analysis essentially plays oﬀ the
two eﬀects of an increase in the money growth rate. There is the first order rate-of-return eﬀect
which cause both types to reduce their money holdings in the face of a higher opportunity cost.
In the absence of type-specific taxes and transfers, a second order transfer/redistributive eﬀect
emerges. For example, in the case of positive money growth rates, the type that holds more
money contributes more to seigniorage than the other type but receives the same transfer, in
eﬀect causing a redistribution of income from the former to the latter.
The possible benefits of a net transfer of income may easily overwhelm the negative rate-of-
return eﬀect for some types of agents. In that case, an increase in the money growth rate may
even be welfare enhancing for some. Much depends on the rate at which each type adjusts their
money balances in response to an increase in the money growth rate. We show that at least one
of the types always dislikes the Friedman rule (locally). We go on to show that if the type that
holds more money dislikes the Friedman rule locally, their welfare is never maximized globally
at a non-negative money growth rate. Interestingly, it is possible for everyone to prefer positive
nominal interest rates over Friedman’s zero-nominal-interest-rate prescription. In terms of the
question posed by the title of this paper then the answer may be that everyone is “afraid” of
the Friedman rule. Societal welfare, defined as the population-weighted aggregate welfare of both
types in our model, is almost never maximized at the Friedman rule.
The upshot is that unlike in models with representative agents, here the prescription for
“optimal” monetary policy depends on whether welfare of the individual or that of society is
being maximized. Our analysis highlights some crucial components of the inevitable political
economy dimensions of the larger question of the optimal monetary policy.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1 : m¯H > m¯L
First, for z > 0, we prove that m¯H > m¯L by contradiction. Choose any z > 0. Suppose m¯L ≥ m¯H .
Then (7) holds. Further, from (5), it is implied that
uc(c¯L)
uc(c¯H)
< 1, which in turn implies c¯L > c¯H .
But, given (6a) and (6b), this violates our assumption. Hence, m¯H > m¯L for all z > 0.
Now, choose any z < 0. A suﬃcient condition for m¯L < m¯H is that
v0(m¯L)−v0(m∗i)
v0(m¯H)−v0(m∗i) > 1.
Notice that for all z > β−1 an upper bound for the consumption of L types is y¯+µ (1− β)m∗L.
Alternatively, a lower bound for the consumption of the H types is y¯−(1− µ) (1− β)m∗L. Thus,
a lower bound for
uc(c¯L)
uc(c¯H)
λH
λL equals
uc(y¯+µ(1−β)m∗L)
uc(y¯−(1−µ)(1−β)m∗L)
λH
λL . Hence,
uc(y¯+µ(1−β)m∗L)
uc(y¯−(1−µ)(1−β)m∗L)
λH
λL > 1
implies that
v0(m¯L)−v0(m∗i)
v0(m¯H)−v0(m∗i) > 1. Note that
d
dy¯
"
uc
¡
y¯ + µ (1− β)m∗L
¢
uc (y¯ − (1− µ) (1− β)m∗L)
#
=
ucc
¡
y¯ + µ (1− β)m∗L
¢
uc
¡
y¯ − (1− µ) (1− β)m∗L
¢
− uc
¡
y¯ + µ (1− β)m∗L
¢
ucc
¡
y¯ − (1− µ) (1− β)m∗L
¢
[uc (y¯ − (1− µ) (1− β)m∗L)]2
> 0
where we have used the fact that ucc < 0 and uccc > 0 for any CES form. Define y¯∗ as the
value of y¯ that obtains
uc(y¯∗+µ(1−β)m∗L)
uc(y¯∗−(1−µ)(1−β)m∗L) =
λL
λH . Thus, a suﬃcient condition for m¯
L < m¯H is
that y¯ > y¯∗. For u (.) ≡ ln (.), it is easy to show that y¯∗ = (1− β) m∗LλH−λL
³
λH (1− µ) + λLµ
´
.
Finally, note that when m∗H = m∗L, m¯H = m¯L holds at the Friedman Rule trivially.
B Proof of Lemma 2: dm¯
L
dz ,
dm¯H
dz ≤ 0
As we have assumed that the consumption utility has a CES form, let u (c) = c
1− 1σ−1
1− 1σ
, where σ
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ = 1 represents the logarithmic case. Note that
equations (5) - (6b) simultaneously determine consumption and real money balances in steady
state for type-i agents. Totally diﬀerentiating them together yields
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ v
H
mm
uHc
+
uHcc
uHc
Zπ (z) (1− µ) −u
H
cc
uHc
Zπ (z) (1− µ)
−u
L
cc
uLc
Zπ (z)µ v
L
mm
uLc
+
uLcc
uLc
Zπ (z)µ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ dmHdzdmL
dz
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 1(1+z)2
h
β − (1− µ)
¡
mH −mL
¢ uHcc
uHc
π (z)
i
1
(1+z)2
h
β + µ
¡
mH −mL
¢ uLcc
uLc
π (z)
i ¯¯¯¯¯¯
Who is Afraid of the Friedman Rule? 25
where Z ≡ 11+z . Note that uic ≡ uc
¡
c¯i
¢
and uicc ≡ uc
¡
c¯i
¢
.17 Using Kramer’s rule, and after some
algebra, obtain
dmL
dz
=
1
(1 + z)2
β
h
vHmm
uHc
− σ y¯c¯H c¯LZπ (z)
i
− σµ m¯H−m¯Lc¯L
vHmm
uHc
π (z)
vHmm
uHc
vLmm
uLc
− σ
h
µv
H
mm
uHc
1
c¯L + (1− µ)
vLmm
uLc
1
c¯H
i
Zπ (z)
(32a)
dmH
dz
=
1
(1 + z)2
β
h
vLmm
uLc
− σ y¯c¯H c¯LZπ (z)
i
+ σ (1− µ) m¯H−m¯Lc¯H
vLmm
uLc
π (z)
vHmm
uHc
vLmm
uLc
− σ
h
µv
H
mm
uHc
1
c¯L + (1− µ)
vLmm
uLc
1
c¯H
i
Zπ (z)
(32b)
Below, we evaluate the above derivatives for the entire range of z in two steps:
Step I: z ≥ 0 : Note first that dmHdz < 0, since all terms on the numerators are negative, while
all in the denominator are positive. However, a suﬃcient condition for dm
L
dz < 0 is
1− µσm¯
H − m¯L
c¯L
π (z) > 0
For σ = 1, i.e., the log case, the above inequality holds if
cL = y¯ + µZ
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
> µσ
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
π (z) , i.e.,
y¯ > µ
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
(σπ (z)− Z)
As dm
H
dz < 0, an upper bound for the RHS equalsmaxz≥0
{(σπ (z)− Z)}µ m¯H ¯¯
z=0
. Thus a suﬃcient
condition for dm¯
L
dz < 0 is that y¯ > ϕ m¯
H
¯¯
z=0
, where ϕ = µσ (1− β) if σβ < 1, ϕ = µ (σ − 1) if
σβ > 1. Note that m¯H
¯¯
z=0
= λ
H y¯m∗H
(1−β)m∗H+λH y¯ . Hence,
y¯ > y¯∗∗ = m∗H
µ
ϕ− 1− β
λH
¶
⇒ dm
L
dz
< 0
which we have assumed in the main text.
Step II: z = β − 1 : Finally, at the Friedman rule z = β − 1, π (z) = 0, and then
dm¯L
dz
=
1
β
uLc
uLmm
< 0 and
dm¯H
dz
=
1
β
uHc
uHmm
< 0
C Proof of Lemma 3
At the Friedman rule π (z) = 0. Then, using (32a) and (32b), we obtain
dmH
dz
− dm
L
dz
¯¯¯¯
π(z)=0
=
1
β
µ
uHc
vHmm
− u
L
c
vLmm
¶
Thus, following (11) and (9), a type−L (H) agent’s utility will increase (decrease) with z at the
Friedman rule, if and only if
uc
¡
c∗H
¢
λHwmm (m∗H)
−
uLc
¡
c∗L
¢
λLwmm (m∗L)
− m
∗H −m∗L
1− β < 0
where, from (6a) and (6b), c∗L = y¯−µ1−ββ
¡
m∗H −m∗L
¢
and c∗L = y¯+(1− µ) 1−ββ
¡
m∗H −m∗L
¢
.
17 Recall from our assumption in Section 2.3 that the functional form of the consumption utility is
identical for both types.
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D Proof of Proposition 3
Diﬀerentiating the social welfare function yields
dW
dz
= µ
dWH
dz
+ (1− µ) dW
L
dz
Using (6a), (6b), and (9) in (11), and simplifying yields
(1− β) dW
dz
= µ uHc
∙
π (z)− Z (1− µ)
µ
1− u
L
c
uHc
¶¸
dm¯H
dz
−
µ (1− µ)
¡
uHc − uLc
¢
(1 + z)2
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
(34)
+(1− µ)π (z)uLc
dm¯L
dz
+ µ (1− µ)
¡
uHc − uLc
¢
Z
dm¯L
dz
From Corollary 1, we know that for any z ≥ 0, c¯L ≥ c¯H , uLc ≤ uHc . Further, from Lemma 2
dm¯H
dz < 0 and
dm¯L
dz < 0, and
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
> 0 by Lemma 1. Hence, all the terms on the right
hand side of (34) are nonpositive. Thus for all z ≥ 0, dWdz < 0 holds. Hence, z ≥ 0 can not be
socially optimal.
E A cash-in-advance economy in which money growth aﬀects output
Let the agents be endowed with a unit of labor. Their period utility functions are identical
ui (c, l) ≡ u (c, 1− l) , i ≡ L,H, (35)
where 1−l is the amount of leisure they enjoy, and the function u (., .) has the standard properties.
The agents are diﬀerentially endowed with technologies
yi = αif
¡
li
¢
, αH > αL, (36)
and the f (.) has the standard properties of a production function. Each household consists of a
shopper seller pair. While the shopper goes to the market with cash to buy consumption good,
seller works and sells output to the buyers who arrive at the factory outlet. Thus, at the end of
period t, the seller accumulates the following money balances:
M it = pty
i
t = ptα
if
¡
lit
¢
(37)
In steady state, (37) can be rewritten as
mit = y
i
t = α
if
¡
lit
¢
(38)
The shopper, on the other hand, inherits nominal balances from the previous period, receives
transfers from the government, and then goes out to shop. Thus,
ptcit ≤M it−1 + Tt (39)
Note that
Tt = Mt −Mt−1, or
τ t =
Mt −Mt−1
pt
=
zMt−1
pt
=
z
1 + z
mt−1
The cash-in-advance constraint, (39), can be rewritten as
cit ≤ mit−1
pt−1
pt
+ τ t (40)
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Clearly, (40) binds with equality in the steady state. Otherwise exchanging excess real balances
with consumption will be a strict improvement. The optimization problem maximizes
∞X
s=t
βs−tu
¡
cis, 1− lis
¢
= u
µ
αif
¡
lit−1
¢ pt−1
pt
+ τ t, 1− lit
¶
+βu
µ
αif
¡
lit
¢ pt
pt+1
+ τ t+1, 1− lt+1
¶
+..
subject to constraints (37) and (40). The optimum is characterized by the following first-order-
condition:
−ul
¡
cit, l
i
t
¢
= αif 0
¡
lit
¢ β
(1 + z)
uc
¡
cit+1, l
i
t+1
¢
; for i = L,H (41)
Steady state In steady state, (41) yields
−uil = αif 0
¡
l¯i
¢ β
(1 + z)
uic
which is equation (17) in the main text. Further, equation (40) can be rewritten as
c¯i =
m¯i
1 + z
+
z
1 + z
m¯
c¯i = m¯i +
z
1 + z
¡
m¯− m¯i
¢
= αif
¡
l¯i
¢
+
z
1 + z
¡
m¯− m¯i
¢
where the last step makes use of (38). Since m¯ = µm¯H+(1− µ) m¯L, the steady state consumption
is given by
c¯L = αLf
¡
lL
¢
+
z
1 + z
µ
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
, (42a)
c¯H = αHf
¡
lH
¢
− z
1 + z
(1− µ)
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
. (42b)
which are presented as (18a) and (18b) in the main text.
F Proof of Lemma 5
To check if the H types would like to deviate, we diﬀerentiate H type’s utility aggregate with
respect to z, and use (29) with (31) to obtain
d
dz
∙
c¯H + λH
µ
ln m¯H − m¯
H
m∗H
¶¸
= − (1− µ) m
∗
1 + z
∙
1
(1 + κHπ (z))
− 1
(1 + κLπ (z))
¸
+(1− µ) z (m
∗)2
1 + z
β
(1 + z)2
"
1
λH
(1 + κHπ (z))2
−
1
λL
(1 + κLπ (z))2
#
+π (z)
dm¯H
dz
.
Clearly, at the FR π (z) = 0, the first and the last term vanish, while the second term is
positive. Now, unlike the previous case, the H types would prefer z > β − 1. But can it be that
z˜H > 0? The answer is negative, as seen from the derivative above. At z = 0, i.e., π (z) = 1−β, the
second term vanishes and the first and the third term are negative. Thus, there lies a maximum
for z˜H ∈ (β − 1, 0). It is easy to see that this must be the H types’ global maximum, as for any
z > 0 they incur both a loss of consumption as well as a loss of real balances.
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G Proof of Lemma 6
Using (30) in (21), we obtain
(1− β)
¡
UL
¯¯
zFR
− UL
¯¯
z
¢
= u
h
y¯ + λL (lnm∗ − 1)
i
−u
∙
y¯ + µZ
¡
m¯H − m¯L
¢
+ λL
µ
ln m¯L − m¯
L
m∗
¶¸
Thus UL
¯¯
zFR
− UL
¯¯
z
≶ 0 if and only if
y¯ + λL (lnm∗ − 1) ≶ y¯ + µZ ¡m¯H − m¯L¢+ λLµln m¯L − m¯L
m∗
¶
Using (29), the above condition can be rewritten as
µκLZπ (z)
∙
κL − κH
(1 + κLπ (z)) (1 + κHπ (z))
¸
≶
∙
ln
¡
1 + κLπ (z)
¢
− κ
Lπ (z)
1 + κLπ (z)
¸
Note that the RHS is always positive. But for any z ≤ 0, the LHS is nonpositive. Hence UL
¯¯
zFR
>
UL
¯¯
z
for all z ≤ 0.
For the second part, suppose κH = 0. Then, UL
¯¯
z>0
> UL
¯¯
zFR
if and only if
κLπ (z)
1 + κLπ (z)
µ
1 +
µZ
π (z)
κLπ (z)
¶
> ln
¡
1 + κLπ (z)
¢
(43)
Fix any z = z˜ > 0. It is easily shown that the above condition holds for all κL > κˆL, where κˆL
is obtained as an implicit solution of
κˆLπ (z˜)
1 + κˆLπ (z˜)
Ã
1 +
µZ˜
π (z˜)
κˆLπ (z˜)
!
= ln
³
1 + κˆLπ (z˜)
´
.
By continuity, (43) should hold for κH > 0, provided κL is then suﬃciently larger than κH .
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